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Abstract. Noninterference, which is an information flow property, is
typically used as a baseline security policy to formalize confidentiality
of secret information manipulated by a program. Noninterference verifi-
cation mechanisms are usually based on static analyses and, to a lesser
extent, on dynamic analyses. In contrast to those works, this paper pro-
poses an information flow testing mechanism. This mechanism is sound
from the point of view of noninterference. It is based on standard testing
techniques and on a combination of dynamic and static analyses. Con-
cretely, a semantics integrating a dynamic information flow analysis is
proposed. This analysis makes use of static analyses results. This special
semantics is built such that, once a path coverage property has been
achieved on a program, a sound conclusion regarding the noninterfering
behavior of the program can be established.
1 Introduction
With the intensification of communication in information systems, interest in
security has increased. This paper deals with the problem of confidentiality, more
precisely with noninterference in sequential programs. This notion is based on
ideas from classical information theory (1) and has first been introduced by
Goguen and Meseguer (2) as the absence of strong dependency (3).
“information is transmitted from a source to a destination only when
variety in the source can be conveyed to the destination” Cohen (3,
Sect.1).
A sequential program, P, is said to be noninterfering if the values of its
public (or low) outputs do not depend on the values of its secret (or high) inputs.
Formally, noninterference is expressed as follows: a program P is noninterferent if
and only if, given any two initial input states σ1 and σ2 that are indistinguishable
with respect to low inputs, the executions of P started in states σ1 and σ2 are
low-indistinguishable. Low-indistinguishable means that there is no observable
⋆ The author was partially supported by National Science Foundation grants CCR-
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difference between the public outputs of both executions. In the simplest form of
the low-indistinguishable definition, public outputs include only the final values
of low variables. In a more general setting, the definition may additionally involve
intentional aspects such as power consumption, computation times, etc.
Static analyses for noninterference have been studied extensively and are
well surveyed by Sabelfeld and Myers (4). Recently, and to a lesser extent, dy-
namic analyses for noninterference have been proposed (5; 6; 7). However, to
be useful, those dynamic analyses must be combined with an information flow
correction mechanism in order to enforce noninterference at run-time. As shown
by Le Guernic and Jensen (8), in order to prevent the correction mechanism
to become a new covert channel, additional constraints are put on the dynamic
analysis. Those constraints limit the precision achievable by a monitor enforc-
ing noninterference. A dynamic information flow analysis which is not used at
run-time to enforce noninterference could therefore be more precise than its
equivalent noninterference monitor.
This paper develops an information flow testing mechanism based on such a
dynamic information flow analysis which is not aimed at enforcing noninterfer-
ence at run-time. It is presented as a special semantics integrating a dynamic
information flow analysis combined with results of a static analysis. A distin-
guishing feature of the dynamic information flow analysis proposed, compared
to other standard run-time mechanisms, lies in the property overseen. Dynam-
ically analyzing information flow is more complicated than, e.g., monitoring
divisions by zero, since it must take into account not only the current state of
the program but also the execution paths not taken during execution. For exam-
ple, executions of the following programs (a) if h then x :=1 else skip and
(b) if h then skip else skip in an initial state where h is false are equiva-
lent concerning executed commands. In contrast, (b)’s executions are noninter-
fering, while (a)’s executions are not. Executions of (a), where x is not equal to
1, do not give the same final value to x if h is true or false.
The next section starts by giving an overview of the dynamic information flow
analysis at the basis of the approach. It then describes the testing technique used
and, finally, presents the language studied. Before characterizing in Sect. 3.2 and
3.3 the static analyses used by the dynamic analysis and stating some properties
of the proposed analysis, Section 3 presents the semantics which incorporates
this dynamic analysis. Finally, Sect. 4 concludes.
2 Presentation of the approach
With regard to noninterference, a dynamic analysis suited only for the detection
of information flows, and not their correction, can be used only for noninterfer-
ence testing. The idea behind noninterference testing is to run enough executions
of a program in order to cover a “high enough percentage” of all possible exe-
cutions of the program. In cases where the dynamic analysis results enable to
conclude that all the executions evaluated are safe, users gain a confidence in the
“safe” behavior of the program which is proportional to the coverage percentage.
When dealing with the confidentiality of secret data, a percentage lower than
100% does not seem acceptable. The aim of noninterference testing is then to
cover all possible executions. It is not possible to run an execution for every pos-
sible input set (as there are frequently infinitely many input values). However,
the results of a dynamic information flow analysis may be the same for many
executions with different inputs. Therefore, it may be possible to conclude about
the noninterference behavior of any execution of a program by testing a limited,
hopefully finite, number of executions. Before presenting the testing approach
proposed in this paper, this section introduces some terminology, formally de-
fines what is meant by “noninterfering execution” and gives an overview of the
dynamic information flow analysis proposed in Section 3.
2.1 Overview of the noninterference analysis
A direct flow is a flow from the right side of an assignment to the left side.
Executing “x := y” creates a direct flow from y to x. An explicit indirect flow
is a flow from the test of a conditional to the left side of an assignment in the
branch executed. Executing “if c then x := y else skip end” when c is true
creates an explicit indirect flow from y to x. An implicit indirect flow is a flow
from the test of a conditional to the left side of an assignment in the branch
which is not executed. Executing “if c then x := y else skip end” when c is
false creates an implicit indirect flow from y to x.
A “safe” execution is a noninterfering execution. In this article, as commonly
done, noninterference is defined as the absence of strong dependencies between
the secret inputs of an execution and the final values of some variables which
are considered to be publicly observable at the end of the execution.
For every program P, two sets of variable identifiers are defined. The set of
variables corresponding to the secret inputs of the program is designated by
S(P). The set of variables whose final value are publicly observable at the end of
the execution is designated by O(P). No requirements are put on S(P) and O(P)
other than requiring them to be subsets of X. A variable x is even allowed to
belong to both sets. In such a case, in order to be noninterfering, the program P
would be required to, at least, reset the value of x.
In the following definitions, we consider that a program state may contain
more than just a value store. This is the reason why a distinction is done between
program states (ζ) and value stores (σ). Following Definition 1, two program
states ζ1, respectively ζ2, containing the value stores σ1, respectively σ2, are
said to be low equivalent with regards to a set of variables V , written ζ1
V
= ζ2, if
and only if the value of any variable belonging to V is the same in σ1 and σ2.
Definition 1 (Low Equivalent States).
Two states ζ1, respectively ζ2, containing the value stores σ1, respectively σ2, are
low equivalent with regards to a set of variables V , written ζ1
V
= ζ2, if and only
if the value of any variable belonging to V is the same in σ1 and σ2:
ζ1
V
= ζ2 ⇐⇒ ∀x ∈ V : σ1(x) = σ2(x)
Definition 2 (Noninterfering Execution).
Let ⇓s denote a big-step semantics. Let S(P) be the complement of S(P) in the set
X. For all programs P, program states ζ1 and ζ
′
1, an execution with the semantics
⇓s of the program P in the initial state ζ1 and yielding the final state ζ
′
1 is
noninterfering, if and only if, for every program states ζ2 and ζ
′
2 such that the
execution with the semantics ⇓s of the program P in the initial state ζ2 yields the
final state ζ ′2:
ζ1
S(P)
= ζ2 ⇒ ζ
′
1
O(P)
= ζ ′2
The dynamic information flow analysis uses results of static analyses. The se-
mantics integrating the dynamic analysis, now on called analyzing semantics,
treats directly the direct and explicit indirect flows. For implicit indirect flows,
a static analysis is run on the unexecuted branch of every conditional whose test
carries variety — i.e. is influenced by the secret inputs of the program.
A program state for this semantics is composed of a value store, σ, mapping
variables to values, and a tag store, ρ, mapping variables to a tag. This tag reflects
the level of variety of a variable. At any point of the execution, a variable whose
tag is ⊥ would have the exact same value for any execution started with the
same public inputs. A variable whose tag is ⊤ may have a different value for an
execution started with the same public inputs. In other words, the variety in the
secret inputs may be carried to the variables which are tagged ⊤, and only those
variables.
2.2 Noninterference Testing.
The main idea behind noninterference testing has been exposed above. Figure 1
sketches this idea. Let P be a program whose secret inputs are represented by
h, public inputs by l, and public outputs by a color (or level of gray). P(li, hj),
where (li, hj) are input values, is the public output, represented by a color, of
the execution of P with the inputs (li, hj). In the representations of Fig. 1, public
input values are represented on the x-axis and secret input values are represented
on the y-axis. Each point of the different graphs corresponds to the execution of
P with, as inputs, the coordinates of this point. Whenever a point in the graph
is colored, the color corresponds to the public output value of the execution of P
with, as inputs, the coordinates of the colored point. Figure 1(a) represents the
execution of P with inputs (l0, h0). Its public output value is represented by the
color (or level of gray) and its tag — result of the dynamic information flow
analysis — is ⊥ (the public output does not carry variety). Figure 1(b) shows the
meaning of this tag. As the public output tag of P(l0, h0) is ⊥, it means that for
any secret inputs hj the public output value of P(l0, hj) is the same as for P(l0,
h0); it is . Even if there exist secret inputs h1 for which the public output tag of
P(l0, h1) is ⊤, any execution of P with public inputs l0 is noninterfering. It only
means that the dynamic analysis is not precise enough to directly detect that
the execution of P with inputs (l0, h1) is noninterfering. However, this result can
be indirectly deduced from the result of the dynamic analysis of the execution
of P with inputs (l0, h0).
The main challenge of noninterference testing is to develop a dynamic analysis
for which it is possible to characterize a set of executions which associate the
same tag to the public output as an execution which as already been tested.
For example, assume that it has been proved that all executions in the dashed
area in Fig. 1(c) associate the same tag to the public output as the execution
of P with inputs (l0, h0). As this tag is ⊥, it is possible to conclude from the
single execution of P with inputs (l0, h0) that all colored (or grayed) executions in
Fig. 1(d) are noninterfering. Therefore, with only a limited number of executions,
as in Fig. 1(e), it is possible to deduce that the program is noninterfering for a
wide range of inputs which can be characterized.
l
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⊥
(a) Execution P(l0, h0)
l
h
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l
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l
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Fig. 1. Sketch of the main idea of noninterference testing.
Which executions need to be tested? As exposed above, in order to be able to
conclude on the interference behavior of a program by testing it, it is necessary
to be able to characterize a finite number of executions which are sufficient to
conclude about all executions of this program. It is then necessary to develop a
dynamic analysis which has the right balance between the number of executions
covered by one test and the precision of the analysis.
The solution approached here assumes there is no recursive calls and is based
on “acyclic Control Flow Graphs” (aCFG). As its name suggests an aCFG is
a Control Flow Graph (CFG) without cycles. In an aCFG, there is no edge
from the last nodes of the body of a loop statement to the node corresponding
to the test of this loop statement. Instead, there is an edge from every last
node of the body of the loop to the node corresponding to the block following
the loop statement. Figure 2(a) shows the standard CFG of the following code:
“if c1 then while c2 do P1 done else P2 end”. Figure 2(b) shows its aCFG.
In an acyclic CFG, there is a finite number of paths. The maximum number of
paths is equal to 2b, where b is the number of branching statements (if and
while statements) in the program.
Begin
c1
c2
P2 End
false
true
P1
false
true
(a) Standard CFG
Begin
c1
c2
P2
true
End
true
P1
false
false
(b) Acyclic CFG
Fig. 2. CFG and aCFG of the same program
The approach to noninterference testing proposed in this section is based
on a dynamic information flow analysis which returns the same result for any
execution that follows the same path in the aCFG of the program analyzed.
Let the acyclic CFG trace of an execution be the list of nodes of the aCFG
encountered during the execution. Let τ [[σ ⊢ P]] be the acyclic CFG trace of the
execution of program P with initial value store σ. Let T[[ζ ⊢ P]] be the result of the
dynamic information flow analysis of the execution of P in the initial program
state ζ (its formal definition is given on page 8). The constraint imposed on
the dynamic information flow analysis for the noninterference testing approach
proposed is formalized in Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1 (Usable for noninterference testing)
For all programs P, value stores σ1 and σ2, and tag stores ρ:
τ [[σ1 ⊢ P]] = τ [[σ2 ⊢ P]] ⇒ T[[(σ1, ρ) ⊢ P]] = T[[(σ2, ρ) ⊢ P]]
With such a dynamic analysis, the problem of verifying the noninterference be-
havior of any execution is reduced to the well known testing problem of achieving
100% feasible paths coverage (9; 10; 11; 12; 13). For path whose branch condi-
tions are linear functions of inputs, Gupta et al. (14) propose a technique which
finds a solution in one iteration or guarantees that the path is infeasible.
2.3 The Language: Syntax & Standard Semantics
The language used to describe programs studied in this article is an imperative
language for sequential programs. Expressions in this language are deterministic
— their evaluation in a given program state always results in the same value —
and are free of side effects — their evaluation has no influence on the program
state. The standard semantics of the language is given in Fig. 3. The evaluation
symbol (⇓) is given a subscript letter in order to distinguish between the standard
semantics (S) and the analyzing one (A). The standard semantics is based on
rules written in the format: σ ⊢ P ⇓S σ
′. Those rules means that, with the
initial program state σ, the evaluation of the program P yields the final program
state σ′. Let X be the domain of variable identifiers and D be the semantics
domain of values. A program state is a value store σ (X → D) mapping variable
identifiers to their respective value. The definition of value stores is extended to
expressions, so that σ(e) is the value of the expression e in the program state σ.
σ ⊢ skip ⇓S σ
σ(e) = true σ ⊢ P l ; while e do P l done ⇓S σ
′
σ ⊢ while e do P l done ⇓S σ
′
σ ⊢ x := e ⇓S σ[x 7→ σ(e)]
σ(e) = v σ ⊢ P v ⇓S σ
′
σ ⊢ if e then P true else P false end ⇓S σ
′
σ ⊢ P h ⇓S σ
h σh ⊢ P t ⇓S σ
t
σ ⊢ P h ; P t ⇓S σ
t
σ(e) = false
σ ⊢ while e do P l done ⇓S σ
Fig. 3. Rules of the standard semantics
3 The Analyzing Semantics
The dynamic information flow analysis and the analyzing semantics are defined
together in Fig. 4. Information flows are tracked using tags. At any execution
step, every variable has a tag which reflects the fact that this variable may carry
variety or not.
3.1 A semantics Making Use of Static Analysis Results
Let X be the domain of variable identifiers, D be the semantics domain of values,
and T be the domain of tags. In the remainder of this article, T is equal to {⊤,⊥}.
Those tags form a lattice such that ⊥ ⊏ ⊤. ⊤ is the tag associated to variables
that may carry variety — i.e. whose value may be influenced by the secret inputs.
The analyzing semantics described in Fig. 4 is based on rules written in the
format:
ζ ⊢ P ⇓A ζ
′ : X
This reads as follows: in the analyzing execution state ζ, program P yields the
analyzing execution state ζ ′ and a set of variables X. An analyzing execution
state ζ is a pair (σ, ρ) composed of a value store σ and a tag store ρ. A value store
(X → D) maps variable identifiers to values. A tag store (X → T) maps variable
identifiers to tags. The definitions of value store and tag store are extended to
expressions. σ(e) is the value of the expression e in a program state whose value
store is σ. Similarly, ρ(e) is the tag of the expression e in a program state whose
tag store is ρ. ρ(e) is formally defined as follows, with V(e) being the set of free
variables appearing in the expression e:
ρ(e) =
⊔
x∈V(e)
ρ(x)
Definition 3 (T[[ζ ⊢ P]]).
T[[ζ ⊢ P]] is defined to be the final tag store of the execution of P with the initial
state ζ. Therefore, for all programs P, value stores σ and tag stores ρ, if the
evaluation of P in the initial state (σ, ρ) terminates then there exists a value
stores σ′ and a set of variables X ′ such that:
ζ ⊢ P ⇓A (σ
′, T[[ζ ⊢ P]]) : X ′
The set of variables X contains all the variables whose value may be modified
by an execution of P having the same trace than the current execution — i.e. all
executions whose trace is τ [[σ ⊢ P]].
The semantics rules make use of static analyses results. In Fig. 4, application
of a static information flow analysis to the piece of code P is written: [[ρ ⊢ P]]♯G .
The analysis of a program P must return a pair (D,X). D, which is a subset of
(X × X), is an over-approximation of the dependencies between the initial and
final values of the variables created by any execution of P. D(x), which is equal
to {y | (x, y) ∈ D}, is the set of variables whose initial value may influence the
final value of x after an execution of P. X, which is a subset of X, is an over-
approximation of the set of variables which are potentially defined — i.e. whose
value may be modified — by an execution of P. This static analysis can be any
such analysis that satisfies a set of formal constraints which are stated below.
The analyzing semantics rules are straightforward. As can be expected, the
execution of a skip statement with the semantics given in Fig. 4 yields a final
state equal to the initial state. The execution of the assignment of the value of
the expression e to the variable x yields an execution state (σ′, ρ′). The final
value store (σ′) is equal to the initial value store (σ) except for the variable
ζ ⊢ skip ⇓A ζ : ∅
(EA-SKIP)
(σ, ρ) ⊢ x := e ⇓A (σ[x 7→ σ(e)], ρ[x 7→ ρ(e)]) : {x}
(EA-ASSIGN)
ζ ⊢ P h ⇓A ζ
h : Xh ζh ⊢ P t ⇓A ζ
t : Xt
ζ ⊢ P h ; P t ⇓A ζ
t : Xh ∪ Xt
(EA-SEQUENCE)
σ(e) = v (σ, ρ) ⊢ P v ⇓A (σ
v, ρv) : Xv [[ρ ⊢ P¬v]]♯G = (D, X)
Xe = Xv ∪ X ρ′ = ρv ⊔
`
(Xe × {ρ(e)}) ∪ (Xe × {⊥})
´
(σ, ρ) ⊢ if e then P true else P false end ⇓A (σ
v, ρ′) : Xv
(EA-IF)
σ(e) = false [[ρ ⊢ P l ; while e do P l done]]♯G = (D, X)
ρ′ = ρ ⊔
`
(X × {ρ(e)}) ∪ (X × {⊥})
´
(σ, ρ) ⊢ while e do P l done ⇓A (σ, ρ
′) : ∅
(EA-WHILEfalse)
σ(e) = true σ ⊢ P l ; while e do P l done ⇓S σ
v
[[ρ ⊢ P l ; while e do P l done]]♯G = (D, X)
ρD =
˘`
x ,
F
y∈D(x) ρ(y)
´
| x ∈ X
¯
ρR = ρD ⊔
`
(X × {ρ(e)}) ∪ (X × {⊥})
´
(σ, ρ) ⊢ while e do P l done ⇓A (σ
v, ρR) : X
(EA-WHILEtrue)
Fig. 4. Rules of the analyzing semantics
x. The final value store maps the variable x to the value of the expression e
evaluated with the initial value store (σ(e)). Similarly, the final tag store (ρ′) is
equal to the initial tag store (ρ) except for the variable x. The tag of x after the
execution of the assignment is equal to the tag of the expression computed using
the initial tag store (ρ(e)). ρ(e) represents the level of the information flowing
into x through direct flows.
For an if statement, the branch (P v) designated by the value of e is executed
and the other one (P¬v) is analyzed. The final value store is the one returned by
the execution of P v. The final tag store (ρ′) is the least upper bound of the tag
store returned by the execution of P v and a tag store reflecting indirect flows.
This latter tag store associates the tag of the branching condition to variables
potentially defined by an execution having the same trace or an execution of the
other branch. If the tag of the branching condition is ⊥, the final tag store is
therefore equal to the tag store returned by the execution of P v.
The execution of while statements is similar to the execution of if state-
ments. However, in order to be able to apply the testing technique exposed in
Section 2.2, it is required to have the same tag store for every execution following
the same path in the acyclic CFG. Therefore, the final tag store is computed
from the result of a static analysis of the branch executed (skip if the branching
condition is false) and not from the tag store obtained by the execution of the
branch designated by the branching condition. For the same reason, the set of
variables returned by the execution of a while statement is obtained by static
analysis of the branch executed.
3.2 Hypotheses on the static analysis used
The static analysis used on unexecuted branches is not formally defined. In
fact, the dynamic analysis can use any static analysis which complies with the
three following hypotheses and returns a pair, whose first element is a relation
between variables — i.e. a set of pairs of variables — and second element is a
set of variables.
The first two hypotheses require a sound static analysis. Hypothesis 2 simply
requires the static analysis used to be a sound analysis of defined variables.
More precisely, it requires that the second element of the static analysis result
(X) contains all the variables which may be defined by an execution of the
analyzed program. This is a straightforward requirement as the result of the
static analysis is used to take into account implicit indirect flows. Hypothesis 3
requires the static analysis used to be a sound analysis of dependencies between
the final values of variables and their initial values. The last hypothesis requires
only the static analysis to be deterministic.
Hypothesis 2 (Sound detection of modified variables.)
For all tag stores ρi, analysis results (D,X), testing execution states (σi, ρi) and
(σf , ρf ), programs P and sets of variables X such that:
1. [[ρi ⊢ P]]
♯G = (D,X)
2. (σi, ρi) ⊢ P ⇓A (σf , ρf ) : X ,
the following holds: ∀x /∈ X . σf (x) = σi(x).
Hypothesis 3 (Sound detection of dependencies.)
For all analysis results (D,X), tag stores ρ1, testing execution states (σ1, ρ1),
(σ′1, ρ
′
1), (σ2, ρ2) and (σ
′
2, ρ
′
2), programs P, and sets of variables X1 and X2
such that:
1. [[ρ1 ⊢ P]]
♯G = (D,X)
2. (σ1, ρ1) ⊢ P ⇓A (σ
′
1, ρ
′
1) : X1 ,
3. (σ2, ρ2) ⊢ P ⇓A (σ
′
2, ρ
′
2) : X2 ,
for all x in X:
(
∀y ∈ D(x) . σ1(y) = σ2(y)
)
⇒ σ′1(x) = σ
′
2(x).
Hypothesis 4 (Deterministic static analysis)
The static analysis used is a deterministic analysis. For all tag stores ρ and
programs P, the following holds: | range([[ρ ⊢ P]]♯G ) | = 1.
What is the reason for having a tag store in parameter of the static analysis? In
fact, there is no need for the tag store which is given to the static analysis. This
additional parameter to the static analysis has been added in order to be able
to use existing noninterference type systems in a straightforward way.
Using this tag store, it is easy to construct an analysis satisfying the hypothe-
ses presented above from a type inference mechanism for a sound noninterference
type system. Let X↑ρ be the set of variables whose tag in ρ is ⊤. Let Γρ be a
typing environment in which variables belonging to X↑ρ are typed secret, other
variables can be typed secret or public. Let X↓Γ be the set of variables typed
public in Γ and X↑Γ the set of variables typed secret in Γ . Let DΓ be a relation
among variables which associates every variable of X↑Γ to every variable (X), and
associates every variable of X↓Γ to every variable of X↓Γ . If P is well-typed under
Γρ and the program “if h then P else skip end” is well-typed under Γ
′
ρ with h
typed secret in Γ ′ρ, then (DΓ , X↑
Γ ′) is a result satisfying the Hypotheses 2 and 3
if any variable tagged ⊥ in ρ has the same value in σ1 and σ2.
3.3 Another Characterization of Usable Static Analyses
The above hypotheses define which static information flow analyses are usable,
i.e. which static analyses can be used with the special semantics given in Fig. 4.
However, Hypotheses 2 and 3 are stated using the special semantics itself. This
makes it more difficult to prove that a given static analysis satisfies those hy-
potheses.
Figure 5 defines a set of acceptability rules. The result (D,X) of a static
information flow analysis of a given program (P) is acceptable for the analyzing
semantics only if the result satisfies those rules. This is written: (D,X) |= P. In
the definitions of those rules, Id denotes the identity relation. ◦ is the operation
of composition of relations.
(S ◦ R) =
⋃
(a,b)∈R
{(a, c) | (b, c) ∈ S}
Using the acceptability rules of Fig. 5, it is possible to characterize some static
information flow analyses which are usable with the analyzing semantics without
referring to the analyzing semantics itself. It is also possible to generate a usable
static information flow analysis by fix-point computation on the acceptability
rules; in fact, only on the rule for loop statements. However, those acceptability
rules do not define a most precise usable static analysis.
As stated by Theorem 1, any acceptable static analysis result satisfies Hy-
pothesis 2. Theorem 2 states that any acceptable static analysis result satisfies
Hypothesis 3.
Theorem 1 (Acceptable imply sound detection of defined variables).
For all programs P, and analysis result (D,X) such that (D,X) |= P, the Hy-
pothesis 2 holds.
(D, X) |= skip iff D ⊇ Id
(D, X) |= x := e iff D ⊇ Id [x 7→ V(e)] ∧ X ⊇ {x}
(D, X) |= Ph ; Pt
iff there exist (Dh, Xh) and (Dt, Xt) such that:
(Dh, Xh) |= Ph ∧ (Dt, Xt) |= Pt
D ⊇ (Dh ◦ Dt) ∧ X ⊇ (Xh ∪ Xt)
(D, X) |= if e then Ptrue else Pfalse end
iff there exist (Dtrue, Xtrue) and (Dfalse, Xfalse) such that:
(Dtrue, Xtrue) |= Ptrue ∧ (Dfalse, Xfalse) |= Pfalse
X ⊇ (Xtrue ∪ Xfalse) ∧ D ⊇
`
D
true ∪ Dfalse ∪ (X × V(e))
´
(D, X) |= while e do Pl done
iff there exists (Dl, Xl) such that:(Dl, Xl) |= Pl and
D ⊇
`
(Dl ◦ D) ∪ Id ∪ (X × V(e))
´
∧ X ⊇ Xl
Fig. 5. Acceptability rules for usable analysis results
Proof. As X contains an over-approximation of variables on the left side of every
assignments in P, a variable which is not in this set can not be assigned to. And
therefore, its value remains unchanged.
Theorem 2 (Acceptable imply sound detection of dependencies).
For all programs P, and analysis result (D,X) if (D,X) |= P then the Hypothe-
sis 3 holds.
Proof. The proof follows directly from the acceptability rules. The value of ev-
ery assigned variables depends on the values of the variables appearing in the
expression on the right side of the assignment. The rule for sequences links the
dependencies created by both statements. Variables whose value can be modified
in a conditional are accurately stated to depend on the values of variables ap-
pearing in the branching condition. And finally, in the rule for while statements,
D
l ◦ D ⊆ D ensures that the dependencies created by one or more iterations of
the loop are contained in D. While Id ⊆ D ensures that dependencies existing
in case of no iteration at all are also contained in D.
Therefore, a static information flow analysis, which satisfies Hypothesis 4
and whose results are acceptable ([[ρ ⊢ P]]♯G |= P), is usable by the analyzing
semantics — i.e. it satisfies Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4.
3.4 Properties of the Analyzing Semantics
Section 3.1 formally defined the dynamic information flow analysis proposed in
this article. The soundness of this analysis with regard to the notion of nonin-
terfering execution (Definition 2) is proved by Theorem 3. This means that, at
the end of any two executions of a given program P started with the same public
inputs (variables which do not belong to S(P)), any variables whose final tag is ⊥
has the same final value for both executions. Theorem 4 states that the dynamic
analysis results for two executions following the same path in the acyclic CFG
are identical. Therefore, the dynamic information flow analysis proposed can be
used with the testing technique presented in Section 2.2.
Theorem 3 (Sound Detection of Information flows).
Assume that the analyzing semantics ⇓A uses a static analysis ([[]]
♯G ) for which
Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 hold. For all programs P, sets of variables X1 and X2,
and execution states (σ1, ρ1), (σ
′
1, ρ
′
1), (σ2, ρ2) and (σ
′
2, ρ
′
2) such that:
1. ∀x ∈ S(P). ρ1(x) = ⊤,
2. ∀x /∈ S(P). σ1(x) = σ2(x),
3. (σ1, ρ1) ⊢ P ⇓A (σ
′
1, ρ
′
1) : X1 ,
4. (σ2, ρ2) ⊢ P ⇓A (σ
′
2, ρ
′
2) : X2 ,
the following holds: ∀x ∈ X. (ρ′1(x) = ⊥) ⇒ (σ
′
1(x) = σ
′
2(x)).
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the derivation tree of the third local hy-
pothesis and by cases on the last evaluation rule used. For inductions, the set
S(P) is replaced by the set of variables whose tag is ⊤, and the second local hy-
pothesis (with S(P) replaced) is proved to be an invariant. The proof is straight-
forward for skip and assignments, and goes by simple induction for sequences.
For conditionals, if both executions execute the same branch then the conclusion
follows from a simple induction. Otherwise, it means that the expression tested
(e) does not have the same value for both execution; and therefore that ρ1(e) is
⊤. Hence, as any variables which are modified in the branch executed (X) or
potentially modified by an execution of the other branch (X) receive the tag of e
in the final tag store (ρ′1), the desired conclusion is vacuously true for variables
assigned by any of the two executions and follows directly from the second local
hypothesis for the other variables.
Theorem 4 (Identical Same Path Analysis Results).
If the analyzing semantics ⇓A uses a static analysis ([[]]
♯G ) for which Hypothe-
ses 2, 3 and 4 hold then Hypothesis 1 holds.
Proof. Once again, the proof goes by induction and cases on the derivation tree.
The proof is direct for skip, assignments and sequences. For if statements, as
the trace is the same then the branch executed is the same and the proof follows
by induction. For while statements, the final tag store is constructed from the
result of the static analysis of the statement. Therefore, the conclusion follows
directly from Hypothesis 4.
4 Conclusion
To the best of the author knowledge, this article proposes the first information
flow testing mechanism which enjoys the property of being sound with regard to
noninterference. It is based on a special semantics integrating a dynamic infor-
mation flow analysis which is sound from the point of view of noninterference for
the tested execution, and returns the same sound result for any execution follow-
ing the same path in the acyclic Control Flow Graph (aCFG) of the program.
After testing once every path in the aCFG, a sound conclusion with regard to
noninterference can be stated for the program under test. The dynamic analysis
combines information obtained from executed statements with static analysis re-
sults of some unexecuted pieces of code. No particular static analysis is required
to be used. Instead, three hypotheses on the results of the static analysis used
are defined. It is proved that any static analysis respecting those hypotheses
can be soundly used. A construction mechanism to obtain such a static anal-
ysis from existing noninterference type systems is given. Additionally, a set of
constraints relating statements and the result of their static analysis is defined
independently from anything else. This set of constraints is proved to subsume
the three hypotheses stated before.
Given test cases covering all the feasible paths in the aCFG, the testing
mechanism proposed returns a conclusion as strong as the conclusion returned
by the static analysis used by the testing semantics. Moreover, this result is at
least as precise as the result returned by the static analysis alone. The increase
in precision is proportional to the number of if statements whose condition is
not influenced by a secret.
To the author knowledge, there is no similar work. The vast majority of
research on noninterference concerns static analyses and involves type systems
(4). Some “real size” languages together with security type system have been
developed (for example, JFlow/JIF (15) and FlowCaml (16)). A few dynamic
information flow analyses have been proposed (5; 7; 17). However, those analyses
are applied on final users executions and are therefore required to correct “bad”
flows. In order to prevent this correction mechanism to become a new covert
channel, additional constraints are applied on the dynamic analysis (8). Those
additional constraints limit the precision achievable by such dynamic analyses.
While testing, there is no need for a correction mechanism and therefore a higher
precision can be achieved.
Noninterference testing is an interesting field of study having its own specific
challenges. It may be hard, so not impossible (14), to come out with a valid set
of executions in order to cover all feasible paths in the aCFG. However, in many
cases, the noninterference mechanism proposed in this article is more precise
than the static analyses which can be used by the testing technique proposed.
Thus, noninterference testing may allow to validate some specific programs whose
validation is out of reach of static analyses, or at least help find information flow
bugs.
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